In recent months, CBP has moved to begin what officials describe as taking C-TPAT to the next level. It has tightened participation standards for importers and has plans to do the same for carriers and foreign manufacturers. Within the next month or two it will release a draft implementation plan for a tiered benefit system, which would provide a certain level of benefits depending on whether a company has been certified or validated or is exceeding minimum standards and has adopted C-TPAT best practices.

CSI is also gearing up for some potential changes. Most notably, the fiscal year (FY) 2006 authorisation bill for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), passed by the House of Representatives on 18 May, would limit the inclusion of foreign ports in CSI unless DHS determines, on the basis of a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, that the benefits of such designation outweigh the costs of expanding the programme to that port. In addition, the foreign government would have to agree to (i) establish security criteria to identify, based on advance information, the potential compromise by terrorists or terrorist weapons of maritime cargo containers bound for the US, and (ii) screen or inspect such containers for potential compromise prior to shipment to the US. Cargo containers arriving at a US port of entry from a CSI port would have to undergo the same level of anti-terrorism inspection and screening as containers from a non-CSI port, unless the containers were initially inspected at the CSI port at the request of CSI personnel and such personnel verify and electronically record that the inspection indicates that the containers have not been compromised by terrorists or terrorist weapons.

The legislation, which will now be considered by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, would require the DHS to establish, within six months, standards and procedures for securing maritime cargo containers relating to the obligation to seal, recording of seal changes, modal changes, seal placement, ocean carrier seal verification, and addressing seal anomalies. Within another three months, the DHS would have to issue container security regulations consistent with these standards. The DHS and other federal agencies would then be required to pursue international container security agreements based on these standards to the maximum extent practicable.

In addition, the bill would authorise the DHS to conduct a demonstration programme that integrates radiation detection equipment with other types of non-intrusive inspection equipment at an appropriate US port. This programme would also evaluate ways to strengthen the capability of DHS personnel to analyse cargo inspection data and ways to improve the transmission of inspection data between appropriate DHS entities. The DHS would be required to consolidate Operation Safe Commerce, the Smart Box Initiative, and similar programmes that evaluate container security enhancements in order to achieve better co-ordination and efficiency.

Lastly, the legislation allocates US$133.8 million for the CSI during FY 2006, up from US$133.4 million during FY 2005 and a mere US$4.3 million during FY 2002.

In addition to establishing cargo security partnerships with private companies (through C-TPAT) and foreign Customs administrations (through CSI), the US government has sought to promote the adoption and implementation of cargo security principles on a multi-lateral basis. These efforts have taken place for the most part at the World Customs Organisation (WCO), an independent inter-governmental body representing 165 countries whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness of Customs administrations throughout the world.

The importance of securing international movements of cargo and travellers was highlighted by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff during a 19 May speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Chertoff stated that, in order to combat the network of global terrorism, the US and its allies must "move beyond simply partnering on an individual episodic basis to building a true partnership that will operate in a mission-oriented focus." Chertoff's proposal for such a partnership is to create "a world that is banded with security envelopes, meaning secure environments through which people and cargo can move rapidly, efficiently, and safely without sacrificing security." Countries could use security vetting, technology, travel documents, and cargo tracking to develop a universe of people and goods that would be able "to move relatively freely from point to point all across the globe" without having to be "stopped at every point mechanically and re-vetted and rechecked."

Chertoff mentioned several areas where work can begin now toward this goal. For example, the US should develop a "systematic approach to screening that meshes with the approach taken by our overseas allies, that takes advantage of modern technology, and that gives us a real sense of confidence that we are screening out bad people." He noted that the US is currently "using the most primitive kind of screening in many respects," such as "hand searching for certain kinds of bad cargo." Although more technologically advanced devices and sophisticated methods are starting to be used, "we really have to press that forward."

One of the ways that can be done, Chertoff said, is by improving processes for gathering and sharing information. For example, with respect to cargo containers, the US would like to know "as much as one can know about the constituents of a particular container." He noted that freight forwarding and shipping companies already have "a phenomenal ability to track information" about international shipments and suggested that those kinds of systems could be used to "verify who in fact the manufacturer is and what the product is." When sufficient information is provided regarding the contents of a container and the measures taken to secure it, the US will be prepared to allow such "verified freight" to move into the US "very rapidly." Chertoff acknowledged industry concerns about making additional information available to the government, but predicted that shippers will come to see the associated benefits as a competitive advantage.

For his part, on 24 May CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner praised the recent release of the final draft version of the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. The Framework represents the WCO's collective efforts to secure the global supply chain against growing threats of terrorism, criminal activity, and commercial fraud while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade. In addition to increasing both security and facilitation, the Framework has a number of other objectives: enabling integrated supply chain management for all modes of transport; enhancing the role, functions, and capabilities of customs administrations; and strengthening customs-to-customs and customs-to-business co-operation. It will be presented this summer to the 165 WCO member countries for adoption.

According to Bonner, the Framework means nothing unless it is adopted and implemented broadly. Bonner believes that implementation will not occur without "strong and sustained support and involvement of the trade" and called on the American Association of Exporters and Importers to throw its full support behind the initiative. To move things forward, Bonner announced the creation of a division within the CBP Office of International Affairs to assist countries in obtaining detection equipment and training in security and risk managament.

Some of the measures undertaken by CBP to strengthen cargo security have been criticised pointedly in recent reports from the US Government Accountability Office (GAO). As regards C-TPAT, the GAO contends that validations of C-TPAT members are not sufficiently rigorous to ensure that security measures are reliable, accurate, and effective, as they only examine a few of the measures outlined in the security profile. There are no written guidelines for supply chain specialists to indicate what scope of effort is adequate in a validation, in part because CBP wants to avoid the appearance of conducting an audit. However, without such guidelines, CBP cannot be sure that it effectively and consistently verifies a standard set of security measures to ensure some minimally appropriate level of vulnerability reduction, nor can it apply a methodical approach to assessing the security procedures. In addition, the GAO said, CBP has not determined the extent to which validations are needed. The agency has had to discard its original goal of validating all members within three years because of the programme's rapid growth, but it "has not come up with an alternative goal for the number or percentage of members that should be validated." Instead, it uses a risk assessment tool that ranks importers according to factors such as value of imports, import volume, and method of transportation. According to the GAO, CBP should address current weaknesses in the programme before making any fundamental changes.
CBP has responded to this criticism by claiming that it is already taking steps to address these failures. For example, it is developing standard operating procedures, guidance, and written baseline criteria for the validation process, as well as an automated tool to document validations. CBP has also developed initial performance measures relating to membership, inspection percentages, and validation effectiveness, and it plans to enlist the help of a contractor to develop other outcome-based performance measures and targets.

The GAO was also critical of CSI, asserting that CBP has not been able to target all US-bound shipments at participating ports. As of September 2004, only about 65% of such shipments (representing about 43% of all shipments to the US by oceangoing cargo containers) were targeted and therefore subject to inspection at CSI ports. The GAO attributed much of the blame to staffing imbalances and weaknesses in manifest data. It also found problems with the inspection of those containers that are targeted. Statistics as of last fall show that 28% of such containers were not inspected at CSI ports, although 93% of these were subsequently inspected at a US port. In addition, CBP has not established minimum technical requirements for the detection capability of the various types of non-intrusive inspection and radiation detection equipment used at CSI ports. As a result, CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying weapons of mass destruction.